Biografia Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão

Naran: 
Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão

Loron Moris: 

20 fulan Juñu tinan 1946

Moris Fatin: 

Manatutu, Timor-Leste 

Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, moris iha loron 20 fulan Juñu, tinan 1946 iha Manatutu, Timor-Leste. Moris iha país nia laran, hamutuk ho halin mane ida no feton na’in lima. Hotu tiha ensinu primáriu no hahú fali ensinu sekundáriu misaun Katólika Nosa Señora Fátima, iha Dare, hafoin mai fali iha Díli. Hahú sevisu sedu liu, hala’o funsaun fiskál iha obra aban bain rua nian no lorokraik hanorin iha eskola xineza. Iha fulan Abril tinan 1974, hala’o servisu iha redasaun “Lian Timor nian”.

Hafoin hala’o tiha Revolusaun Kravu iha Portugal, iha loron 25 fulan Abril tinan 1974, no hetan oportunidade ba auto-determinasaun no independénsia, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, deside hamutuk hó Asosiasaun Sosiál Demokrata Timorense-ASDT, ne’ebé foin hahú an atu forma no iha tinan ida ne’e duni, transforma iha Frente Revolusionária Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN). Hala’o servisu hanesan jornalista no fotógrafu, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, asumi kargu nu’udar Direktor Adjuntu ba Departamentu Informasaun partidu nian.

Iha loron 7, fulan Dezembru, tinan 1975, hafoin hala’o tiha invazaun fronteirisa armada iha teritóriu Timor-Leste, Indonézia deside invade kapitál Díli. Hafoin Prezidente FRETILIN Nicolau Lobato mate tiha, iha fulan Dezembru tinan 1978, hamutuk ho Membru Komité Sentrál barak FRETILIN nian, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, simu knar hodi organiza hikas fali luta. Iha fulan Marsu, tinan 1981, organiza Konferénsia Nasionál FRETILIN nian ba dala uluk, durante ne’e, foti nia nu’udar líder Rezisténsia no Komandante-Xefe FALENTIL nian (Forsa Armada Libertasaun Nasionál Timor-Leste). Iha fulan Marsu, tinan 1983, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, hatudu nia pragmatizmu, bainhira hahú hala’o negosiasaun formál ho Forsa Armada Indonézia nian (ABRI/TNI), hodi halo sesar-fogu, ne’ebé dura to’o fulan Agostu tinan nebá ne’e.

Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, harí no dezenvolve Polísia Unidade Nasionál ne’ebé hatudu iha koperasaun ativa hó membru Igreja Katólika no ho autoridade tranzitória Timor-Leste, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão aproveita fulan lima sesar-fogu hodi dezenvolve rede organizada klandestina nasionál nian ba dala uluk, ne’eb’e ema hatene hanesan “Frente Klandestina”. Iha tinan 1988 susesu ba inisiativa Unidade Nasionál lori Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão harí CNRM-Konsellu Nasionál Rezisténsia Maubere, hanesan espresaun komandu nasionál apartidáriu luta nian; CNRM ne’ebé tuir mai CNRT, Konsellu Nasionál Rezisténsia Timorensere.

Tinan ida hafoin massakre Santa Kruz, no hafoin hala’o tiha iha guerilla tinan 17 nia laran, ema kaptura Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão iha loron 20 fulan Novembru tinan 1992 iha kapitál Díli. Maiske hetan elojiu iha nível internasionál, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão sai nu’udar alvu hodi simu julgamentu hanesan sena ida no dadur iha prizaun ida ne’ebé destinadu ba krimunozu komún. Maibé, tamba presaun husi komunidade internasionál, autoridade indonézia sira, obrigadu halo nia tranferénsia ba Prizaun Cipinang, rezervadu ba prezu polítiku sira.

Iha prizaun, Xanana Gusmão, dedika nia tempu hodi halo estratejia ba Rezisténsia, hodi estuda mos lian indonéziu, inglés no direitu. Nia mos halo pintura no hakerek poezia, hakiak nia talentu ida ne’ebé hatene tiha ona iha tinan 1975, bainhira nia manan Prémiu Timorense ba Poezia husi poema “Mauberíadas”. Nia pintura balu faan tiha ona, no proveitu husi pintura hirak ne’e, Xanana Gusmão oferese ba Rezisténsia. Iha tinan 1994, nia ensaiu polítiku balu, publika tiha ona iha livru ida, Timor-Leste – Povu ida, Pátria ida, Ed.Kolibri,Lisboa.

Iha Abril tinan 1998, iha Konvensaun Nasionál Timorense iha diáspora, ne’ebé estabelese Konsellu Nasionál Rezisténsia Timorense (CNRT) nian, Xanana Gusmão reafirma tiha ona hó aklamasaun hanesan líder Rezisténsia Timorense no Prezidente CNRT.

Tuir mai iha presaun internasionál ne’ebé makaas liu tan kona-bá libertasaun Xanana Gusmão nian no deklarasaun husi Prezidente Indonézia Habibie, hodi promete atu fó independénsia ba Timor-Leste, bainhira hala’o konsulta popular iha país ida ne’e, rejeita planu autonomia ne’ebé hato’o husi governu, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão tranferidu ba Prizaun Cipinan iha loron 10 fulan, Fevereiru, tinan 1999, hodi ba fali iha prizaun domisiliária iha Salemba, parte sentrál Jakarta nian.

Prosesu dezenvolvimentu polítiku timorense hala’o lalais los no rekoñesimentu internasionál jeneralizadu husi kualidade Xanana Gusmão nian hanesan estadista no líder, nu’udar razaun atu hetan vizita barak-barak ba nia uma prizaun nian, husi parte governu estranjeiru, inklui mos Sekretária Estadu EUA, Madaleine Albright, eis Prezidente EUA, Jimmy Carter, Ministru Negósius Estranjeirus Austrália Alexander Downer no Ministru Negósius Estranjeirus, Japaun Masahiko Komura.

Referendun patrosinadu husi ONU iha loron 30, fulan Agostu, tinan 1999, proposta ba autonomia ne’ebé hato’o husi Indonézia rejeitada ho modo esmagador, hatudu sinál katak, tenki hakotu duni okupasaun indonézia iha Timor-Leste no hahú prosesu tranzisaun ne’ebé lidera husi ONU iha Timor-Leste. Ida ne’e, hanesan aktu demokrátiku ba dala uluk, iha istória Timor-Leste nian.

Iha lorom 7, fulan Setembru, tinan 1999, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, sai husi prizaun domisiliária. Iha fulan Agostu, tinan 2000, hala’o Kongresu Nasionál CNRT nian iha Díli ba dala uluk, hodi foti Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão nu’udar Prezidenti CNRT/Kongresu Nasionál. Iha fulan Novembru, tinan 2000, to’o fulan Abril, tinan 2001, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão sai hanesan Porta-Voz ba Konsellu Nasionál, órgaun lejislativu ida ne’ebé timor ona nian duni, iha Administrasaun Tranzitória Timor-Leste, kompostu husi reprezentante partidu polítiku sira, sosiedade sivil, grupu pós autonomia no krensa relijioza oin-oin.

CNRT/CN disolvidu iha loron 9 fulan Juñu tinan 2001. Hafoin hala’o tiha disolusaun CNRT/CN, Kay Rala Xananna Gusmão konsentra nia esforsu iha AVR-Asosiasaun Veteranu Rezisténsia, organizasaun ida ne’ebé halo parte membru antigu sira husi Frente Klandestina, atu hodi kria kondisaun ba sira nia partisipasaun kualifikada iha prosesu dezenvolvimentu país nian.

Iha loron 14, fulan Abril, tinan 2002, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão eleitu hanesan Prezidente Timor-Leste, hodi simu posse hanesan Prezidente Repúblika Demokrátika Timor-Leste iha loron 20, fulan Maiu, tinan 2002. Nu’udar Prezidenti Repúblika to’o final ba nia mandatu, iha fulan Maiu tinan 2007.

Hafoin husik tiha Prezidénsia, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, eleitu hanesan Prezidenti partidu polítiku CNRT-“Kongressu Nasionál ba Rekonstrusaun Timor-Leste”, ne’ebé forma iha fulan Abril, tinan 2007. Iha fulan Juñu nia laran, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, hala’o kampaña ba eleisaun lejislativa iha nasaun laran tomak. Iha loron 30, fulan Juñu hala’o eleisaun lejislativa, ne’ebé CNRT simu iha segundu númeru, boot liu iha votus no hodi forma kedas aliansa ida ho partidu polítiku tolu, PD (Partidu Demokrátiku) no Koligasaun ASDT-PSD, husi aliansa ne’e hanaran AMP (Aliasa Maioria Parlamentar) no hodi garante asentu iha Parlamentu Nasionál 37 husi 65.

Iha loron 3, fulan Agostu, tinan 2007, S.Ex.sia Prezidenti Repúblika Dr. José Ramos Horta, konvida ofisialmente AMP atu forma Governu tuir mai.

Iha loron 8, fulan Agostu, tinan 2007, iha Palásiu Prezidensiál Lahane, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, simu pose IV Governu Konstitusionál, nu’udar Primeiru-Ministru Repúblika Demokrátika Timor-Leste. Mandatu ba Governu sei hakotu iha tinan 2012.

Loron 7 fulan-jullu tinan 2012, iha eleisaun lejislativa, CNRT hetan votu sira boot liu, hodi garante asentu 30 husi asentu 65 iha Parlamentu Nasionál. CNRT forma koligasaun ho PD no Frente Mudansa, hodi asegura hamutuk asentu 40 ba Bloku Koligasaun hosi partidu tolu nian.

Partidu koligasaun hetan konvite atu forma Governu husi Prezidente Repúblika ne’ebé mós mak foin eleitu, S.Eselénsia Taur Matan Ruak no  iha loron 8 fulan-agostu 2012, V Governo Constitucional [Governu Konstitusionál da-V] simu pose, bainhira IV Governo [Governu da-IV] kompleta loloos ninia Governasaun tinan 5. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão simu pose nu’udar Primeiro-Ministro e Ministro da Defesa e Segurança [Primeiru-Ministru no Ministru Defeza no Seguransa, ba mandatu daruak tinan lima nian.

PRÉMIU:

1975: Prémiu Timorense ba Poezia
1999: Prémiu Sakharov Parlamentu Europeu
2000: Prémiu Dame Kwangjiu (Koreia Sul)
2000: Prémiu Dame Sidney
2002: Prémiu Norte-Sul, Observatóriu Norte-Sul (União Europeia)
2002: Prémiu Paz Félix Houphouët-Boigny UNESKO
2002: Prémiu Labarik “Amigo Adultu Honoráriu”, Suécia
2003: Prémiu Kamiñu ba Paz 2003, Fundasaun Kamiñu ba Paz
2003: Prémiu "Lideransa ho Integridade" International Herald Tribune
2003: Prémiu "Ázia nia Fitun" Business Week

KONDEKORASAUN:

1995: Sidadaun Honoráriu Brazília, Brazil
1998: Orden Liberdade Portugal
1998: Sidadaun Honoráriu Saun Paulo, Brazil
1999: Doutoramentu Honoris Kauza, Universidade Luzíada, Lisboa
2000: Ordem Méritu, Nova Zelándia
2000: Sidadaun Honoráriu Lisboa, Portugal (simu Xave Osan Mean Sidade Lisboa)
2000: Medalla Vise-prezidénsia Repúblika Federál Brazil
2000: Orden Mérito José Bonifácio, Grau ba Graun Ofisiál, Universidade Estadu Riu de Janeiru
2000: Doutoramentu Honoris Kauza Universidade Porto, Portugal
2002: Grande Kolar Orden Kruzeiru Sul, Brazil
2003: Doutoramentu Honoris Kauza, Universidade Viktória
2003: Kavaleiru Honoráriu Grande Kruz Orden S.Miguel e S.Jorge
2004: Doutoramentu Honoris Kauza, Universidade Nasionál Suncheon, Koreia
2006: Grande Kolar Orden Don Infante, Portugal
2006: Doutoramentu Honoris Kauza, Universidade Takushoku, Japaun
2011: Grande Cruz Orden Ipiranga nian, Brazil
2011: Medalla Primeira Klasse Orden Vanuatu nian, Vanuatu
2011: Doutoramentu Onoris Kauza, Universidade Koimbra nian, Portugál
2012: Doutoramentu Onoris Kauza, Universidade Charles Darwin, Austrália
2014: Doutoramentu Onoris Kauza, ISCSP, Portugál
2014: Doutoramentu Onoris Kauza, Universidade Sabah, Malázia

Kaben ho Emília Baptista, 1969 (div) oan 2
Kaben ho Kristy Sword Gusmão, 2000, oan 3

Última actualização: Maio de 2014

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La'o Hamutuk analysis of new Maritime Boundary Treaty

The Timor-Leste-Australia Maritime Boundary Treaty
By Charles Scheiner, La’o Hamutuk.  21 March 2018

Timor-Leste won a great victory on 6 March, when Australia and Timor-Leste signed the Treaty Establishing Their Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea (hereinafter, Boundary Treaty). After decades of occupation and struggle, and tens of billions of dollars in extracted petroleum, the Australian government finally accepted its northern neighbor’s sovereign right to a border based on current international law. This article will examine the provisions and implications of that agreement, its historical significance, and what is likely to happen as a result of the precedent-setting Boundary Treaty.

La’o Hamutuk has actively advocated for a fair maritime boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia since we were founded in 2000,[1] and we campaigned against prior agreements between Australia and Timor-Leste (signed in 2002, 2003 and 2006, all to be voided by the Boundary Treaty). However, this article does not discuss the long history of campaigning, manipulation, duplicity and negotiation which led up to the recent agreement. That fascinating story is told in many publications and on our web site;[2] today we are looking at the present and the future.

Australia has finally recognized Timor-Leste’s national sovereignty.
Although Timor-Leste formally restored its independence in May 2002, Australia has long prevented Timor-Leste from settling their common boundary by withdrawing from international dispute resolution mechanisms; deferring or banning boundary discussions in every interim petroleum-sharing treaty; and insisting on outdated, self-serving, “continental shelf” principles based on 75-year-old practices and the illegal Indonesian occupation. For 14 years, Timor-Leste’s leaders conceded to Canberra’s stubbornness by signing several agreements to enable oil and gas production – the principal source of money for this young nation.

However, many Timor-Leste citizens and international supporters believed that the struggle for independence was not complete until the boundaries of the nation were defined. In 2004, Timor-Leste civil society formed the Movement Against the Occupation of the Timor Sea (MKOTT), friends in Australia formed the Timor Sea Justice Campaign, and activists around their world expressed their solidarity with Timor-Leste’s rights. Our principal objections were to Australia's protracted refusal to talk about a maritime boundary, their denial of the now-well-established “median line” principle of drawing a boundary halfway between two coasts, and their unyielding rejection of any third-party dispute resolution by an international court or arbitrator. Beginning in 2013, Timor-Leste’s government added its diplomacy and resources to the people’s struggle.

Australia’s recent change in policy has deeper significance than mere political and petroleum exhaustion, or even the need to appear less hypocritical when they tell China to obey international law in the South China Sea. From the perspective of many in Timor-Leste and in Australia, this is a significant, hard-fought, victory. We hope that it marks a new era in which “our nations will both benefit when our bond is based on equality, including full recognition of each other’s people, rights and national sovereignty.”[3]

The Boundary Treaty itself
[map available at http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/Boundary/Treaty/TreatyMapCenter.gif]

Previous arrangements
The black line on the map represents the 1972 Australia-Indonesia seabed boundary treaty. That boundary is closer to Indonesia (and to Timor-Leste) than it is to Australia, and remains in force. The “Timor Gap” in the line (the yellow area recently called the Joint Petroleum Development Area) is because Portugal declined to participate in the negotiations, and the 1972 treaty recognized that the Gap’s endpoints may have to be adjusted based on future negotiations with Portuguese Timor or its successor.

The yellow area on the map is the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), which was divided 50-50 between Indonesia and Australia from 1991 to 1999, and 90-10 between Timor-Leste and Australia since the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty. Under the Boundary Treaty nearly all of it belongs 100% to Timor-Leste, although Australia will not pay back the $2.4 billion it took in from oil and gas fields in this area since 1999. (Timor-Leste has received about $21.4 billion.) The JPDA’s edges delimit a petroleum revenue sharing zone, not national territory, although its southern edge is close to the median line between Australia and Timor-Leste.

The light green and pink area is the “Sunrise Unitized Area” defined in a 2003 “International Unitization Agreement” (IUA) between Australia and Timor-Leste.[4]  According to the 2002 treaty, Timor-Leste would get 18% of Sunrise extraction (“upstream”) revenues; this was increased to 50% by the 2006 CMATS Treaty (which was revoked last year), and to 70% or 80% (depending on where the pipeline goes) by the Boundary Treaty.

The Boundary Treaty replaces the Timor Sea Treaty and the Sunrise Unitization Agreement, which join CMATS in the rubbish bin. However, it includes some articles to fulfill functions of these now-defunct agreements, covering governance, revenue-sharing, applicable laws and other topics.

Conciliation leads to compromise
Australia withdrew from international maritime boundary dispute resolution processes two months before Timor-Leste became independent in 2002 to avoid legal accountability. However, they overlooked a never-used mechanism in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, signed in 1982, ratified by Australia in 1994 and by Timor-Leste in 2013). UNCLOS Article 298 and Annex V describe a compulsory conciliation process through which one nation can bring an unwilling neighbor into bilateral boundary discussions which are facilitated by a team of expert “conciliators” appointed by both sides, under United Nations auspices. The conciliators have no power to make binding decisions; all they do is encourage the parties to listen and respond to each other.

Timor-Leste initiated this process in April 2016 and, although Australia initially resisted, they accepted it by September. At the start of the conciliation, each side stated its claim; Timor-Leste’s is red on the map, and Australia’s is orange. The conciliators started out like marriage counselors, separately listening to each party’s needs and concerns and relaying them to the other party, while the two sides sat in separate rooms.

The process took a year and a half, with 13 negotiating sessions in six cities on four continents. In August 2017, Australia and Timor-Leste agreed on the overall outlines of a boundary and brought in the oil companies to help decide how Greater Sunrise would be developed. Although that question remains unresolved, the Boundary Treaty was signed in March 2018 and is pending ratification by both countries.

Scholars of and participants in peaceful mechanisms for resolving international disputes are elated that the conciliation mechanism, which lay dormant for more than three decades, has proved its worth. Once again, Timor-Leste has made history.

The newly-established boundary
Although conciliation was under UNCLOS provisions and the outcome complies with the Law of the Sea, the Boundary Treaty is not a legal ruling handed down by a court or arbitrator. It evolved through diplomatic give-and-take by each government, who argued based on their political, legal, economic and historical preferences. Although the conciliators facilitated the negotiations and encouraged compliance with international law, all decisions were made by the two governments. The final boundary compromise, shown as purple and white lines on the map, largely reflects Timor-Leste’s median line claim for the southern part of the boundary (putting all petroleum-containing areas of the JPDA into Timor-Leste’s territory), while drawing lines in between the two nations’ claims for the lateral boundaries on both sides.  It delineates each country’s seabed (“continental shelf”) and water column (“Exclusive Economic Zone - EEZ”) areas, although Timor-Leste’s eastern and western water column boundaries are still to be negotiated with Indonesia.

Three oil and gas fields have been commercially developed in the JPDA: Elang-Kakatua was shut down in 2007, Kitan closed in 2015, and Bayu-Undan has 2-3 years of remaining production. Many other exploration contracts have been signed and relinquished in other areas of the JPDA, and seventy test wells have been drilled over the last three decades, so that it is unlikely that significant, commercially-viable, oil and gas reserves (other than Greater Sunrise) are yet to be discovered.[5]

All government revenues from fields in the JPDA will go to Timor-Leste once the treaty is ratified, which could increase Dili's take by about $100 million from Bayu-Undan’s last puddles of oil and gas. In the unlikely event that production is restarted at Kitan or Elang-Kakatua, or that the small Kuda Tasi or Jahal oil fields are developed, Timor-Leste will get all the taxes and royalties (after the companies recover their capital investment, operating costs and profits).

On the western side of the JPDA, the southern part of the (white) lateral boundary is further west than the edge of the JPDA. As a result, the small Buffalo field, formerly considered to be in Australian waters, now belongs to Timor-Leste. Buffalo produced 20 million barrels of oil from 1999 until it was decommissioned in 2005, and Australia will keep its revenues from that time. In 2016, a new contract was signed with the Carnarvon company, which believes that can use modern technology to extract about 30 million more barrels. If Carnarvon’s estimates are correct, Buffalo could generate $500 million or more for Timor-Leste over the next decade.

The larger Laminaria-Corallina oil field, which has already yielded more than $2 billion in revenues for Australia and is still in production (but nearing the end of its life), remains in Australian waters. However, the new Treaty provides for moving the northern part of the western lateral further west after Laminaria-Corallina is decommissioned, in order to line up with a future Indonesia-Timor-Leste maritime boundary line. Once again, money already taken by Canberra will not be returned.

On the other side, the central part of the eastern edge of the JPDA has moved outwards, placing more of Greater Sunrise and the area south of it in Timor-Leste’s waters. For the moment, a (white) line has been drawn through the Sunrise Unified Area, placing the northwestern 30% of the field in Australian waters, and the remaining part in Timor-Leste. As the field is still in both countries, it will be managed jointly; both Timor-Leste and Australia need to agree on how it will be developed. The Treaty and conciliators offered several inducements for Timor-Leste to accept a pipeline from Sunrise to the soon-to-be-idle LNG plant which has been processing gas from Bayu-Undan in Darwin, including increasing Timor-Leste’s share of Sunrise revenue from 70% to 80%, but Dili politicians have strongly rejected this option.

As on the west, the eastern lateral is provisional. After Sunrise has been extracted and decommissioned, it will be shifted further east to line up with a future Timor-Leste-Indonesia maritime boundary. In a few decades, all of the (now empty) Sunrise area could be in Timor-Leste’s territory.

Governance agreements and Greater Sunrise
The new Treaty re-authorizes the existence of the “Designated Authority” (DA) created by the Timor Sea Treaty, which has been the Timor Sea Designated Authority (TSDA, 2002-2009), National Petroleum Authority (ANP, 2009-2015), and National Petroleum and Minerals Authority (ANPM, 2015-present). This is a regulatory body which signs contracts and oversees petroleum operations in Timor-Leste and jointly administered land and sea territory, as well as encouraging further development.[6]

Because the Sunrise Unitized Area is still under bi-national oversight, the DA’s work in this area is overseen by a “Governance Board” (GB) made of two representatives appointed by Timor-Leste and one by Australia, which is tasked with deciding the most important “Strategic Issues” relating to the Sunrise project. As the GB decides by consensus, its numeric makeup is not important. If the GB is unable to agree on a Strategic Issue, the DA or the Sunrise contractors may refer it to a Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) consisting of one representative of each country and a third member chosen by the other two.[7]

The Sunrise Joint Venture (Woodside, ConocoPhillips, Shell and Osaka Gas) currently holds two contracts with Australia and two with Timor-Leste for different parts of the Sunrise Unit Area. Under the new Treaty, these four contracts will be replaced by a single one between the Designated Authority and the Sunrise Joint Venture (SJV).[8]

During the conciliation process, the parties had hoped to agree on a Sunrise Development Concept (the basic outline of how Sunrise is to be developed, including the location of the pipeline and LNG plant) before the Boundary Treaty was signed, but this did not happen. Annex B of the Treaty, which defines a Special Regime for Greater Sunrise, refers to “the approved Development Concept” three times, but does not explain how such a Concept is to be approved. This decision, which presumably needs the consent of both governments and the Sunrise Joint Venture, is essential to proceeding with the project.

In 2008, La’o Hamutuk wrote a book Sunrise LNG in Timor-Leste: Dreams, Realities and Challenges, much of which  is still accurate (except for the fiscal analysis).[9]  A detailed assessment of whether it would be good for the people of Timor-Leste to construct a pipeline from Sunrise to an LNG plant in Beaçu and to build the other components of the Tasi Mane Project, is beyond the scope of this article. The currently politicized controversy, with accusations and disinformation, does not lend itself to rational discussion.

Regardless of how Sunrise is eventually developed, La’o Hamutuk is concerned that exaggerated promises of vast revenues and economic benefits may distract from the urgent need to diversify Timor-Leste’s economy away from oil and gas exports and processing. Even according to the most optimistic credible projections, Sunrise will only finance Timor-Leste’s state and economy for less than one generation. We owe it to our children and grandchildren to think further ahead.

Before a Sunrise decision is made, Timor-Leste needs to thoroughly and objectively weigh the financial, economic, environmental and social benefits, costs and risks, including realistic projections of Timorese jobs and spinoff contracts from an LNG plant, as well as the incentives recommended by the Conciliation Commission. Although many studies have been done, none of the published ones we have seen provide accurate and unbiased analysis. We urge that Sunrise be developed to serve the best interests of the people of this country, rather than those of a particular oil company, political faction, or region. The decision is too important to be swayed by emotional, political or personal considerations.

What happens now?
Closed-door discussions will continue on the Sunrise Development Concept, and the transitional arrangements for the Bayu-Undan and Kitan contracts will be implemented.

Before the Boundary Treaty becomes legally effective, it must be ratified by both countries. Until then, Australia will continue to receive 10% of Bayu-Undan revenues (about $4 million per month).

Timor-Leste’s National Parliament has been dissolved, and the new Parliament will not take office before June, with the Eighth Constitutional Government a month or two later. Timor-Leste’s new Council of Ministers and Parliament will probably ratify the Boundary Treaty within two months after that, and we encourage public consultations and careful analysis for consistency with Timor-Leste law.

Australia’s process could take six months, and requires a Parliamentary Inquiry and public hearings by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. We hope that there will be no unnecessary delays.

Timor-Leste will resume negotiating its maritime boundary with Indonesia this year, and it should be easier than with Australia because there is probably no oil and gas under potentially contested areas. Once this is settled, Australia and Indonesia will be able to amend and finally ratify their draft 1997 water column boundary (EEZ) treaty, establishing security and economic rights over their respective water surfaces and fisheries.

However, nothing in the new Australia-Timor-Leste Boundary Treaty disturbs the Australia-Indonesia Seabed Treaty which has been in effect for 46 years. Although some people in Indonesia believe that the older treaty was unfair, Australia has no legal obligation to renegotiate it. Timor-Leste and Australia kept Indonesia informed throughout the recent process, and Jakarta has not objected.

After Timor-Leste and Indonesia have settled their seabed and water column boundaries, and after all the oil and gas in relevant areas has been extracted, the lateral lines of the new Australia-Timor-Leste boundary will be adjusted to line up with the Indonesia boundary.

Article 10 of the new Boundary Treaty says that Timor-Leste shall not “have a claim for compensation” for money collected by Australia under prior treaties and agreements, which totals around five billion dollars. However, nothing in the Treaty prevents Australia from voluntarily returning this stolen money to Timor-Leste. The preamble of the Treaty mentions “promoting Timor-Leste’s economic development” and being “good neighbors and in a spirit of cooperation and friendship … in order to achieve an equitable solution.” In this new spirit of mutual respect, it would be appropriate for Australia to give back what it took during the nearly three decades since it signed the Timor Gap Treaty in order to profit from Indonesia’s brutal and illegal occupation of Timor-Leste.

Notes
[1]   For example, see “Australia: Stop Stealing East Timor's Oil” in the May 2002 La’o Hamutuk Bulletin http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/May/bulletinv3n4.html, as well as our July 2002 submission to the Australian Parliament: http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/Boundary/jsctlh.html .

[2]   See http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/Boundary/CMATSindex.htm for events during the last five years,  http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/OilIndex.html#Boundaries for developments since 2000, or  http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2006/Apr/bulletinv7n1.html#CMATS for a chronology from 1970 to 2006.

[3]   La’o Hamutuk’s March 2013 submission to Australian Parliamentary Inquiry on Relations with Timor Leste, http://www.laohamutuk.org/misc/ParlInq/sub040LaoHamutuk.pdf 

[4]   Unitization is applied when an oil or gas field straddles a boundary in order to avoid disputes over which side a given molecule of petroleum originated on.

[5]   See As Bayu-Undan dries up: challenges and opportunities http://www.laohamutuk.org/misc/TLSA2017/ScheinerTLSABayuDriesEn.pdf 

[6]   La’o Hamutuk is concerned that Article 6.2(c) of the new Boundary Treaty, which allows the DA to keep fees it collects from oil companies, contradicts RDTL Petroleum Fund Law No. 9/2005, which requires that all petroleum-related revenues be deposited into the Petroleum Fund. This was convenient when the first DA was first created before the Petroleum Fund Law was in force, but it is no longer appropriate or legal. Although the technicalities of this issue were considered by the Court of Appeals in Proc. 01/Const/09/TR, it should be re-evaluated before the DA is re-created, in light of the good petroleum governance that Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund was designed for.

[7]   People with “any direct commercial or financial interest” in the operation of the Sunrise project or whose appointment “would create any reasonable perception of, or actual, conflict of interest” cannot serve on the Governance Board or Dispute Resolution Committee.

[8]   The existing Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) for Bayu-Undan and Greater Sunrise, which were signed in 2003, have never been made public. However, according to Article 30.1(a)(1) of RDTL Petroleum Activities Law No. 13/2005 such contracts are public documents, and all PSCssigned since then are available. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) standard that Timor-Leste complies with also requires contract transparency.
     In October 2017, Timor-Leste and Australia exchanged letters committing to revise the Bayu-Undan and Kitan PSCs. The Treaty says that the contract for Buffalo will be replaced, and a new Sunrise PSC will be signed. The companies and the fiscal terms of the contracts will remain as before, although there may be some alterations to comply with the new Treaty and changes in other laws. La’o Hamutuk is concerned that contract transparency is not mentioned in any of the recent bilateral agreements. Although the Boundary Treaty doesn't explicitly violate Timor-Leste law in this area, it fails to inform Australia and the oil companies that the contracts will be made public.
    Everyone familiar with Timor-Leste Petroleum Law (including the companies who participate in EITI) knows that contract transparency is mandatory, and we expect that the new Bayu-Undan, Greater Sunrise, Kitan and Buffalo contracts will be published. It would be a shame -- as well as an insult to RDTL national sovereignty -- if Article 9.2 of the new Treaty (“no effect on rights and obligations arising under the Timor Sea Treaty and IUA”, both of which predated Timor-Leste’s legislation) were used to justify continuing violation of transparency requirements. Timor-Leste is proud of its transparent system of managing petroleum development and revenues, and neither Australia nor the oil companies should be allowed to sabotage it.

[9]   The book is available for free download in English or Bahasa Indonesia, with a summary in Tetum, from http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/LNG/Report.htm.

***********************************************************
La'o Hamutuk
Rua D. Alberto Ricardo, Bebora, Dili, Timor-Leste
Telephone: +670-3321040 or +670-7723-4330
email: laohamutuk@gmail.com 
http://www.laohamutuk.org   blog: http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/

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Water Supply Sustainability Adviser (Closing date - 2 April 2018)

Based in Dili, Timor-Leste

Short Term Adviser (STA) - Up to 130 days to end in 2019

The Program

The Partnership for Human Development (PHD) represents Australia’s long-term vision for enhancing human development in Timor Leste. It brings together the Australian Embassy’s (Timor Leste) diverse activities in health, education, water, sanitation, nutrition, gender equality, disability and social protection into a single program to maximise effectiveness, relevance and performance. This investment in Timor-Leste will work towards Strategic Objective 2 of Australia’s Timor-Leste Aid Investment Plan: enhancing human development. Improved human development will ensure that coming generations of Timorese people are better able to lead, contribute to and benefit from their nation’s economic and social development.

The long-term vision for the water sector in Timor-Leste is that the proportion of Timorese without access to sustainably maintained, safely managed drinking water at the household level, free of faecal and priority chemical contaminants is halved in target areas by 2026.

The Position

This position has been developed to support a three-year prospective evaluation, to assess factors for effectiveness for a rural water supplies model which is being trialled in Bobonaro Municipality. The Water Supply Sustainability Adviser will develop and oversee the evaluation in accordance with the approved Evaluation Project Plan proposal. The Advisor will also translate lessons learned from the evaluation to facilitate the adoption of actions to strengthen the model for water supply sustainability. This key role will provide:

Input 1 (25 days between April and May 2018) – focused on

• Review and refinement of evaluation design and proposal.
• Pilot and test the field Enumerator training, sampling strategy and survey collection approaches designed for the household survey in the field with the WASH team and undertake initial data analysis and review to recommend and implement any final amendments to the survey design and approach from the field pilot
• Develop report to capture initial data analysis, lessons learnt and recommendations for team data collection and management for the interim period before Input #2
• Support the Water Team to develop and test a costed O&M plan for GMFs implementing HILC projects. Ensure that the cases study component of the evaluation captures effectiveness of the refined O&M planning process.

Input 2 (and future inputs) focused on the ongoing evaluation as follows:

• Manage and undertake detailed quantitative and qualitative data enumeration and analysis both in the field with the team
• Lead the further development of programmatic evaluation and model review and refinement.
• Provide intensive mentoring to, and capacity building of the Water Program Manager on water evaluation management (enumeration, team systems/processes for data collection and storage, data cleaning and management, analysis, report writing).

The ideal candidate will have:

• Post-graduate qualifications in integrated water resource management or WASH; or equivalent Water / WASH field experience in Timor Leste
• Significant experience undertaking field research and monitoring and evaluations end-to-end in water management relevant to international development context; from survey design, development of sampling strategies to in-depth data analysis and report writing
• Knowledge of service delivery priorities and challenges, and experience of effecting change in service delivery in Timor Leste
• Experience in project management working both autonomously and as part of a team
• Working knowledge of Tetun highly desirable.

Further Information and How to Apply

Further information for this opportunity can be found from the Careers page of Abt Associates website at http://abtjta.turborecruit.com.au/job/jobDetailsPreview.cfm?id=1014644

It is preferred that all applications should be submitted online via the Careers page listed above.

Applications can also be lodged through PHD Human Resources email hr@phd.tl - please insert the job title in the email subject heading. All applications are to include a current CV and address the key selection criteria.

Closing date: Monday 2 April 2018 (midnight AEST)

We welcome and thank all applications, however only shortlisted applicants will be contacted.

Abt Associates is a recognised leader in the international development sector. Working with our many partners, Abt Associates implements bold innovative solutions to improve the lives of the community and deliver valued outcomes for our clients. We provide a comprehensive range of services from policy to service delivery in the public and private sectors contributing to long term benefits for clients and communities. Operating in remote and challenging environments, we offer innovative solutions, extensive experience in the region, strong technical capacity, and a proven project management track record. We are committed to gender equity in our employment strategies and encourage applications from capable women. Abt Associates is a child safe organisation and promotes the safety, wellbeing and inclusion of all children.

Human Resource | Partnership for Human Development

1^st Lane, Block E01-12, Palm Business & Trade Center

Surik Mas, Fatumeta Bairro-Pite, Dili, Timor-Leste

E: hr@phd.tl |

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Timor Leste Tourism video complication

Timor Leste Tourism video complication From Al_Gagita.

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Timor sea maritime boundaries treaty: energy security, infrastructure and exports. It is not over yet.

After a long and difficult history, on 6 March 2018, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (Timor-Leste ) and the Commonwealth of Australia (Australia ) (together, the States ) signed their new Treaty Establishing Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea (the Treaty ).Signing of the Treaty marks the culmination of the conciliation proceedings between Timor-Leste and Australia. A Conciliation Commission (the Commission) established pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 under Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) administration facilitated the proceedings. It was the first conciliation process to occur under UNCLOS.

At the time of writing this article, the parliaments of each State are yet to ratify the Treaty.2 Once in force, the Treaty will replace the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty3 and the 2003 International Unitisation Agreement for Greater Sunrise.4 The 2006 Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS)5 was terminated on 10 January 2017 as part of the conciliation process.

KEY IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY

++ In essence, Australia has abandoned its historically expansive claims in the Timor Sea and settled those claims with Timor- Leste on more generally accepted bases of public international law. This is consistent with Australia’s strong foreign policy emphasis on maintaining the international rules-based order in the Asia Pacific in light of the potential for significant changes to that order with the re-emergence of China as the region’s dominant state actor.6

++ The focus now turns to the trilateral negotiations between the States and the Woodside-led Greater Sunrise Joint Venture (the Joint Venture)7 on the development of the Sunrise and Troubadour gas fields (Greater Sunrise) under the special regime established by the Treaty (the Special Regime). Striking a balance between commercially efficient development of Greater Sunrise, and the broader economic, political and strategic interests of Timor-Leste’s economic development, will be an important challenge going forward, with potential ramifications for the Australia-Timor-Leste relationship, energy security and the broader foreign policy posture of both States.

++ Timor-Leste will associate a significant strategic premium with any liquefied natural gas (LNG) project that it believes carries the potential to improve its economic independence. That is a strategic premium that is very likely not factored into more traditional ‘rational’ economic models (such as those traditionally favoured by Western project sponsors, investors and financiers). That premium also carries with it the potential to reduce or re-direct its reliance on foreign aid, particularly from Australia (along with the implicit political conditionality of foreign direct aid).8

++ The Government of Timor-Leste is likely to remain committed to Timor-LNG and its efforts to stimulate much needed economic development on its south coast. Projects like Timor.LNG often require ancillary infrastructure like roads, power stations, water and sewage systems. Economics permitting, this infrastructure may also be able to be deployed, at least to some extent, for the benefit of the immediate local area. Timor-Leste will be aware of these benefits. The risk for Australia is the extent to which those benefits may be able to be provided by non-Western state-backed rivals with a lower economic cost of capital or a higher strategic appetite for such investments. That is, if Australia insistently requires Greater Sunrise’s gas be processed at Darwin, it could sacrifice some of its broader strategic imperatives in East Timor.

++ More broadly still, Australia has long held the position that it is in Australia’s national security interests to remain part of the energy security equation in the Asia Pacific region.9 It is natural that Timor-Leste will adopt the same position for itself with respect to its own hydrocarbon resources. Tactically, as our region changes, Australia should be motivated to combine these two objectives as practicably and best it can.

Read full document here: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=724f2a1d-d2d4-466b-a487-2016345371d6

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Vaga Serbiso: National Facilitator - PEFA Assessment

THE WORLD BANK
IBRD • IDA I WORLD BANK GROUP

TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) FOR A SHORT-TERM CONSULTANT (STC):

NATIONAL FACILITATOR ­ PEFA ASSESSMENT

The World Bank Group (WBG) is seeking an individual consultant over the period of early April 2018 to December 2018 as part of its engagement with the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) to prepare a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment.

This position is for a short-term consultant who is expected to be based in Timor-Leste, although applications will be considered by strong candidates who are based elsewhere. The contract is for a period of up to 60 working days. The role is for a National Facilitator. The consultant will be part of the assessment team in charge of conducting a diagnostic evaluation of financial and budget management using the upgraded 2016 PEFA Performance Measurement Framework. The consultant will work under the administrative supervision of the World Bank Group Task-team Leader, the technical supervision of the Lead Assessor, and will support the In-country Assessor.

The upgraded PEFA Framework (set of indicators and performance report) provides an evidence-based tool to measure PFM performance, including fiscal strategy, public investment management, public assets management, revenue forecast^-beyond^-taxation, information on performance of service delivery, internal and external control system, personnel and payroll, public procurement, and reporting of high quality consolidated financial statements that are in need of continued reform to further enhance the effectiveness of the country PFM systems.

This diagnostic has been requested by the Government of Timor-Leste and will be conducted as a Joint Assessment to serve as input into a dialogue around a coordinated, government-led PFM reform plan, as well as serving to inform existing programmatic activities including the EU’s PFM-focused budget support program.

Scope of Work
The national consultant will be fully integrated in the assessment team and support the PEFA assessment team in the following scope of work:

1. Gather the data and documents necessary to support the preparation of draft indicator write-ups in accordance with guidance related to the application of the PEFA Framework;
2. Identify and review existing documents related to the assessment objectives including those that are publicly available and provided in confidence to the assessment team;
3. Prepare responses to comments from peer reviewers, development partners, government counterparts and other stakeholders;
4. Facilitate stakeholder discussions, workshops and capacity building of local stakeholders as required within the scope laid out in these ToRs;
5. Prepare a draft assessment report (section 3 of the PEFA assessment report); 
6. Prepare the final PEFA assessment report;
7. Prepare a systematic and easily understandable record of evidence gathered and the source of information;
8. Any other tasks associated with the objectives of the assessment.
9. Support the Government of Timor-Leste to undertake PEFA self-assessment activities with all relevant line ministries and agencies;
10. Preparation of analytical presentations of performance indicators pertaining to budgetary and financial outcome indicators, to support preparation of the assessment led by the Lead Assessor;
11. Support the World Bank management and Oversight Committee to supervise the activity, including providing contributions and drafting status and briefing reports.

Outputs and expected deliverables

As a core member of the team, the national consultant will support the delivery of a comprehensive Public Financial Management-Performance Report (PFM-PR) ­ PEFA report - prepared according to the upgraded 2016 PEFA methodology drafted in English, that will be submitted to the PEFA Secretariat for quality review and will enable the Government of Timor-Leste and development partners to: assess the performance of recent PFM reforms; identify the key areas for further strengthening of the PFM systems; and discuss further support to the priorities in PFM area.

The specific responsibilities of the national facilitator as required to support the PEFA assessment and related activities, including capacity-building and PEFA self-assessment activity, are set out below:

• Prepare and organize correspondence and meetings on behalf of the PEFA assessment team.

• Participate, and where appropriate contribute, in consultative meetings with stakeholders

• Remain on top of deadlines, deliverables and progress of the PEFA and associated activities.

• Provide verbal and written translation from English to Tetum and vice-versa.

• Independently liaise and follow-up with stakeholders in areas agreed with the PEFA assessment team.

• Organize logistics, attendance, facilities, and documentation on behalf of the PEFA assessment team.

These responsibilities will be met in close consultation with the PEFA assessment team to ensure the consultant supports the exercise in a timely way. Significant time commitment is expected to be required in April, early May and from July to September. Further support may be required in October and November.

Selection Criteria

• At least undergraduate degree or equivalent.
• Masters degree, and/or education in an area related to economics, law, or governance is an advantage.
• At least 5 years of relevant work experience.
• Experience in project or team administration and management, especially preparing good quality written correspondence and working proactively.
• Experience of working with central government or development partners an advantage.
• Excellent command of both spoken and written English and Tetum is essential.
• Strong interpersonal and communication skills, and the ability to work well as part of a team.

Application instructions

Applicants should note that this is a locally based position with no additional benefits. Interested candidates should send their applications to Ms. Maria E. Belo Leite (mbeloleite@worldbank.org), including a brief response (less than 500 words) to the selection criteria, and a current CV.

The closing date for applications is 28 March 2018.

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Public Finance Legal SpecialistSPECIALIST

THE WORLD BANKIBRD • IDA I WORLD BANK GROUP

 

TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) FOR A SHORT-TERM CONSULTANT (STC):

PUBLIC FINANCE LEGAL SPECIALIST

The World Bank Group (WBG) is seeking an individual consultant over the period of early April 2018 to December 2018 as part of its engagement with the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) to prepare a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment.

Timor-Leste legal and regulatory framework is a product of various institutional regimes, including Portuguese, Indonesian and UN administration prior to independence. In recent years, successive governments have undertaken the task to standardize, harmonize and develop further the legal and regulatory framework, while continuing to develop Timor-Leste's public institutions and Governance structure.

The Government is transitioning from a district structure to a system of decentralize municipalities with the establishment of decentralized services at municipal level, which resulted managerial autonomy. In addition, a 13th district ­ Oecusse, has been elevated to a special region given administrative, financial Sand patrimonial autonomy, legal personality and its own bodies.

The number of autonomous public agencies has also increased substantially in recent years, reflecting government's desire to grant greater financial independence to institutions in order to improve their efficiency. Most public-sector entities have been established under separate legislation and are meant to operate under a different^, set of financial-rules to those of central government. Since 2016, the Government has begun to provide them with more financial or managerial autonomy.

PFM functions in Timor-Leste are therefore spread over a wide array of public entities at various levels of government, under different regulatory and supervisory regimes. The purpose of this assignment is to support the identification, consultation and appropriate integration of Timorese legal and regulatory instruments into the PEFA assessment, in close collaboration with the rest of the PEFA assessment team and in consultation with the authorities.

This position is for a short-term consultant who is expected to be based in Timor-Leste, although applications will be considered by strong candidates who are based elsewhere. The contract is for a period of up to 40 working days.

The consultant will report to the World Bank Task Team Leader and the Lead PEFA Consultant, and will work closely with other members of the PEFA assessment team.

Background

The PEFA Framework provides an evidence-based tool to measure PFM performance, including fiscal strategy, public investment management, public assets management, revenue forecast beyond taxation, information on performance of service delivery, internal and external control

system, personnel and payroll, public procurement, and reporting of high quality consolidated financial statements that are in need of continued reform to further enhance the effectiveness of the country PFM systems.

This diagnostic has been requested by the Government of Timor-Leste and will be conducted as a Joint Assessment. It will be the first PEFA assessment since 2013 and the first to be conducted in accordance with the updated, 2016 PEFA framework. The PEFA is expected to serve as an input into a dialogue around a coordinated, government-led PFM reform plan, as well as inform existing programmatic activities, including the EU's PFM-focused budget support program.

The PEFA is supported by the European Union, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the World Bank Group.

Scope of work

The consultant will be fully integrated in the assessment team and support the Lead Assessor to:

a) Through consultations and desk review identify relevant legislation and official public documents and collect relevant information related to the application of the PEFA Framework, particularly relating to Constitution, National Parliament and Government laws, decree laws and resolutions or from any committees thereof, and outputs of the judiciary, such as the Supreme Court of Audit;

b)   Identify changes in legislation and regulations from the previous PEFA (2013), as well as planned changes (including on-going reforms) which have impacted or might impact PEFA performance indicators.

c)    Review, interpret and provide analysis of laws and regulations and their application in order to support relevant aspects-of the PEFA assessment;

d)   Facilitate and/or lead consultations with the authorities relating to the PEFA assessment, particularly in relation to the application and interpretation of laws and regulations;

e)    Provide written inputs as requested by the lead PEFA assessor into the PEFA report and other outputs required to complete the PEFA assessment exercise;

f)     Maintain a record of documentation of sources used as part of the assignment.

Deliverables

·      Launch mission: Participate as a core team member in the launch workshop, consultations and associated activities. (6 days, early April 2018)

·      Further assessment activity and preparation of an interim PEFA assessment report: Carry out further in-country follow-up, liaising with all team members to complete collection of information and preparation of a PEFA assessment report. With other team members, ensure an interim report is prepared, based on all available evidence, no later than end June 2018 (15 days, mid-April to July 2018)

·      Preparation of full report and presentation to the relevant stakeholders: Further analysis and report-writing to prepare a complete report with other team members including assessment of all 2016 PEFA indicators, a summary assessment of indicators under the previous PEFA methodology for backwards compatibility and all other components of a recommendation PEFA assessment report. Presentation of the report in country to Government and other stakeholders, with the aim of securing consensus on the assessment results. This will include participation as a core team member in further mission(s) focusing on in-country consultations (15 days, August and early September, 2018). 

Finalization of the PEFA assessment report based on quality assurance process: Follow up to government internal validation processes, responses to comments and questions and amendments to the PEFA report with the aim of completing the World Bank and PEFA Secretariat quality assurance processes (4 days).

Selection Criteria

• At least undergraduate degree or equivalent in a subject relating to public finance, accounting or law.

• At least Masters degree or equivalent in a subject relating to public finance, accounting or law is desirable.

•  At least 10 years of relevant work experience, with direct experience in public finance law and regulation highly desirable.

• Fluency in written Portuguese is essential.

• Fluency in Tetum is desirable.

• Strong interpersonal skills and the ability to work as part of a diverse team.

Application instructions

Applicants should note that this is a locally based position with no additional benefits. Interested candidates, should send-their applications to Ms. Maria E. Belo Leite ( mleite@worldbank.org ), including a brief response to the selection criteria, and a current CV.

The closing date for applications is 23 March 2018.

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